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The limitation of liability (known as financial caps) of the ship owner has a long tradition in maritime law in general and in the marine
oil pollution compensation regime in particular. This paper uses the economic instrument to critically analyze such a mechanism, in order
to answer the question if the financial caps are indeed a historical mistake.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Recent years have witnessed the occurrence of a great many
oil spills in Europe, and other parts of the world. The names
Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz etc. refer to the major incidents
that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. Shortly after the Torrey
Canyon incident an international convention on civil liability
for oil pollution damage of 1969 was promulgated together
with an additional fund convention in 1971. These conven-
tions had the alleged goals of guaranteeing some compensa-
tion to the victims of oil pollution damage. A strict liability
was imposed on the tanker owner, but at the same time the
liability was channelled to him. This means that no party
other than the tanker owner can be held liable for the
pollution damage. In addition strict limits on liability applied,
the so-called financial caps.
Meanwhile new accidents, also in the United States (with
the Exxon Valdez), made clear that the international regime,
as it had been established at the end of the 1960s, could not
provide compensation in a satisfactory way. Even more
recently new incidents again hit the coasts of Europe, more
particularly with the Erika (off the coast of Brittany-France)
in 1999 and the Prestige (off the coast of Galicia-Spain) inee front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
arpol.2007.10.008
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pleandhui@yahoo.com (H. Wang).2002. As a result of these ever-increasing incidents, always
new amendments to the international conventions were
adopted in order to increase the amounts of liability.
Recently, in 2003, a supplementary fund was established to
provide a so-called third tier of compensation in addition to
the Civil Liability Convention (CLC) and the existing
international oil pollution compensation fund.
Notwithstanding all these adaptations of the conventions
with ever new amendments, still the question arises why the
damage caused by oil spills is dealt with in a totally different
way to traditional damage. Indeed, as was mentioned above,
the regime in the international oil pollution conventions
differs quite substantially from traditional tort law in most
legal systems. This is more particularly the case for the
so-called channelling, which means that not all parties
involved in oil pollution incidents are held liable, but that the
liability is (often exclusively) directed to the tanker owner
under the conventions. Also the fact that liability is capped
to a certain amount of course constitutes a serious deviation
from traditional tort law.
In that respect many important questions arise, some
of which we would like to tackle in this paper. First of
all the question arises why, in a historical perspective,
financial caps were introduced in maritime law in general,
but in the oil pollution conventions in particular. Indeed,
the financial caps in maritime law in general have already
been referred to as ‘an anachronism’ in the literature [1],
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1These conventions include, inter alia, the International Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading of 1924
and its 1968 Protocol, United Nations Convention on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea 1978, which are the conventions for transport of goods by
sea; the Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their
Luggage, which is the convention for the carriage of passengers by sea; the
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by
Sea 1996, which is the convention for transportation of hazardous and
noxious substances by sea.
2E.g. in the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to
International Transportation by Air, known as the Warsaw Convention
1929, the air carrier’s liability for the death or injury of the passenger is
limited to $75,000 per passenger.
3Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy, 1960.
4The Protection & Indemnity Clubs owe their origin to the first UK
legislation which exposed ship owners to potential liabilities larger than
the value of the ship plus pending freight. It provided a limitation fund
based on a sterling multiple of the ship’s tonnage and made it impossible
to provide for liability coverage as part of the normal hull insurance. So it
has been said that the present system of the ship owner’s liability insurance
is therefore literally built on the concept of limitation.
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of applying these traditional financial caps of maritime law
to damage caused by oil pollution. Hence, it seems
necessary to conduct a basic legal historical analysis of
the documents preceding the conventions to examine the
precise reasons for the mentioned deviations (more
particularly the financial caps). Of course, when addressing
this legal history, the question will inevitably also come up
whether particular interest groups may have lobbied in
favor of these deviations.
In addition, the question arises how these financial caps
can be viewed from a law and economics perspective. The
traditional economic analysis of law can thus be used to
critically analyze the limitation of liability. When the
economic analysis points at the possible inefficiency of the
financial caps, again the legal history will be used to
examine why these inefficiencies were introduced in the
international conventions at the time.
The paper thus follows different methodological ap-
proaches: both traditional economic analysis of accident
law and interest group analysis will be followed as well as a
legal historical perspective, more particularly to find out
the formal reasons given for the introduction of financial
caps and channelling and to identify a possible influence of
interest groups.
Hence, the paper will be structured as follows: after this
introduction (Section 1) an historical overview of the use of
financial caps in maritime law will be provided (Section 2).
Next, the caps in the international conventions on oil
pollution damage will be described on the basis of an
analysis of their legal history and the subsequent evolution
of the conventions (Section 3). The limitation of liability
for oil pollution damage has been criticized in legal and
economic literature; a brief summary of this critique in the
literature is provided (Section 4). Next a simple economic
analysis of financial caps for oil pollution damage is
provided on the basis of the economic analysis of accident
law (Section 5). Subsequently, the economic analysis is
linked with the historical analysis by asking the question
whether the financial caps should be considered as a
historical mistake (Section 6). A few concluding remarks
follow (Section 7).
2. History of financial caps in maritime law
2.1. Overview
The general principle in tort law is restitutio in integrum,
meaning that the victim shall receive full compensation, if
the conditions for tort liability are met. However, there are
exceptions to this principle, where the liability of the
tortfeasor is capped to a certain amount. In maritime law,
this is known as the limitation of liability of the shipowner
(and its representatives).
The precise origin of limitation of liability in maritime law
is not entirely clear, but it has a long history in maritime
tradition [2], and it has now been widely employed invarious areas related to shipping activities. However, today
the concept of the limitation of liability in maritime law is
also subject to criticism [1]. Internationally, there have been
conventions on the limitation of liability of the shipowner
and its representatives, mainly the International Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the
Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea-going Vessels
(Limitation Convention 1924), International Convention
relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-
going Ships 1957 (Limitation Convention 1957), Convention
on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976
(LLMC 1976) and its 1996 Protocol (LLMC 1996). In
addition, in various specific areas of maritime activities,
there are conventions which provide for the limitation right
as well. For example, for the carriage of goods by sea, the
carriage of passengers by sea, and for the transportation of
hazardous and noxious substance by sea, there are different
conventions allowing shipowners to cap their liability.1 In
the area of oil shipping, there is the International Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 1969 (the
CLC), which grants the shipowner the right to limit his
liability as in other maritime shipping activities.
The limitation of liability is not a mechanism peculiar to
maritime law. Carriers in other forms of transportation,
e.g. transport by road and air, are also entitled to such a
limitation right [3].2 More recently, when nuclear energy
was discovered, conventions were adopted which equally
grant the right of limitation to the operator of a nuclear
power plant.3 Hence, to cap the liability of the tortfeasor to
a certain amount is far from being unique to maritime law,
but it is particularly important in the context of maritime
law due to its long tradition and widespread influence in
various areas of maritime activities. The limitation of
liability is considered the backbone of maritime law and
many other institutions in maritime law developed on the
basis of the limitation system [4].4
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Table 1
Caps in oil pollution (in USD)a
Ship tonnage 1969 CLC 1992 CLC 2000 Amendment
p5000 ton 203/ton 4.5 million 7 million
45000 ton 203/ton 4.5 million+636/ton 7 million+963/ton
Overall limit 21 million 90 million 136 million
1971 Fund 1992 Fund 2000 Amendment 2003 Fund
Maximum per incident 91 million 204 million 307 million 1134 million
aThe original ‘‘unit of account’’ provided in the Conventions is ‘‘the Special Drawing Right as defined by the International Monetary Fund’’ (referred to
as SDR). See Article V. 9 (a) of the 1992 CLC and Article 1.4 of the 1992 Fund Convention. For the convenience of calculation, the SDR is converted to
USD, based on the rate on 1 June 2007 as defined by the International Monetary Fund. Information available at the website of the IOPC Fund:
www.iopcfund.org/SDR.htm, last accessed on 31 August 2007.
Table 2







Tanio 1980 43.9 62.6
Haven 1991 62.5 71.6
Aegean Sea 1992 63.5 115
Braer 1993 86.9 89.2
Nakhodka 1997 196.3 215.6
Erika 1999 200 450
Prestige 2002 200 877
aWe have taken the estimates of damage caused from the thesis of Julien
Hay (see Ref. [51]). The amounts for the Erika and Prestige incidents are
estimates based on the Annual Report 2005 of the IOPC Fund. The
amounts have for reasons of simplicity and comparability all been
transformed to US Dollars. The exchange rate used here is also from the
Annual Report 2005 of the IOPC Fund.
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As mentioned before, the origin of the limitation of
liability as a concept is not so clear, and there are different
opinions concerning this issue. Some scholars believed that
the Amalphitan Table of Italy in the 11th century is ‘‘the
earliest extant evidence of the shipowner’s right to limit his
liability’’ [5–7].5 Some other scholars believed that the right
of a shipowner to limit his liability dated back to the 17th
century, as exemplified by the provisions on limitation in
the Statutes of Hamburg 1603, the Hanseatic Ordinances
1614 and 1644, and in the Maritime Code of Sweden 1667
[3]. Most importantly, the Maritime Ordinance of Louis
XIV 1681 codified maritime law in France and was used as
a model in the Netherlands, Venice, Spain and Prussia
(Tables 1 and 2).
The international maritime world decided to unify the
rules on limitation of liability at the beginning of the 20th
century. This led to the conclusion of the Limitation
Convention 1924. This convention entered into force in
1931, but it had little practical value because major
shipping countries did not adopt it.6 It was hence
abrogated by the Limitation Convention 1957.
Under the Limitation Convention 1957,7 a broad class of
parties can enjoy the right of limitation, which include the
charterers, managers and operators; the limitation amounts
were increased.
The LLMC 19768 has replaced the Limitation Conven-
tion 1957 and has considerably increased the limitation
amounts and expanded the individuals who are entitled to
limit their liability. Under the LLMC 1976, a distinction5According to Donovan [7], the Amalphitan Table (also known as
Tables of Amalfi) was a commercial code compiled for the ‘free and
trading Republic of Amalphia’ (Italy).
6There were 15 countries that ratified or acceded to the 1924
Convention, but six of them have denounced it. Data from the website
of CMI: www.comitemaritime.org.
7International Convention relating to the Limitation of the Liability of
Owners of Sea-going Ships, adopted 10 October 1957, entered into force
1968.
8Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976,
adopted 19 November 1976, entered into force 1 December 1986.was made between claims for loss of life or personal injury
and claims for property damage. The LLMC 19969 further
increased the amounts of limitation and introduced a tacit
acceptance procedure for updating the limitation amounts.
2.3. Justifications from a historical perspective
From the enactment of the early laws on the limitation of
liability, some observations can be made concerning the
motives for introducing financial caps in maritime law.
First, a limitation of liability for the shipowner was
originally needed to encourage the development of ship-
ping activities which were considered risky at the time.
Second, the promotion of the national merchant fleet under
the competitive pressure led to the decision of various
countries to introduce a financial cap on the liability of
shipowner into their legislation [8,9].
However, with the change of the commercial structure
and the modern technology, these reasons advanced in the
17th century were not valid any more. A more recent
justification for the limitation of liability concerned a fair9Protocol of 1996, adopted 3 May 1996, entered into force 13 May 2004.
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11SDR stands for special drawing rights, and it is defined by the
International Monetary Fund. The conversion rate used here is the rate on
1 June 2007. Information available at the website of the IOPC Fund:
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maritime adventure (even with modern technology) and it
was considered equitable to make all those who benefit
from the activity bear the risks in order to achieve an
equitable risk distribution among them.
Another justification developed in modern theory was
the protection of the carrier, and of those who benefit from
the shipping activities [8]. It was argued that if the carrier
had to bear all the risks and related costs without a
limitation, he might be either driven out of business
(whereby the choice of vessels available to cargo owners are
reduced), or would be forced to pay a high premium for
insuring his potential liability (which would result in the
increase of the freight he charged to the cargo owner).
A third justification for financial caps in the context of
modern trade is that a statutory limitation of liability is
necessary to meet the needs of liability insurance.10 It was
often argued that the capacity of the insurance market was
not infinite. Unlimited liability was considered uninsurable,
or at least the insurance costs would be unreasonably high.
Moreover, the insurance costs already constituted a large
part of the operational costs. To expose the shipowner to
unlimited liability would lead to a high premium which
would constitute a too heavy burden for the shipping
industry, so it was held [4].
3. Caps in international conventions on oil pollution damage
3.1. Overview of the limitation of liability for oil pollution
damage
The international regime on oil pollution damage
compensation was originally established through two
conventions, the International Convention on Civil Liabi-
lity for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (the CLC 1969) and the
International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage 1971 (the Fund Convention 1971). The CLC 1969
imposed a strict liability of the shipowner capped to certain
amount with the requirement of compulsory insurance.
The Fund Convention 1971 provided a second tier of
compensation contributed by the oil industry. These two
conventions were amended in 1984, but due to the failure
of the US to ratify these amendments, they did not come
into force. Hence, most of the changes made in 1984 were
taken over in the 1992 Protocols whereby the caps in the
CLC and the compensation from the Fund were both
substantially increased. As a reaction to the oil spills of
Erika (1999), the 1992 Conventions were amended in
October 2000, whereby the financial caps were increased by
50%, with effect from November 2003; later, in reaction to
the Prestige incident (2002), a Supplementary Fund
contributed by the oil industry was established in 2003 to
provide a third tier of compensation, which entered into10The insurance factor was emphasized during the drafting for the CLC
1969, LLMC 1976 and HNS Convention 1996.force on 3 March 2005. As a result, the total amount
available for the oil pollution compensation (in the
countries that have ratified the 2003 Protocol) has reached
750 million SDR (around US$1134 million) [10].11
As a reaction to the Supplementary Fund, the Interna-
tional Group of P&I Clubs offered to increase on a
voluntary basis the indemnification amount of small
tankers it eventually pays to the Fund. This is known as
Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement
(STOPIA), which came into effect on 3 March 2005, the
same date as the entry into force of the Supplementary
Fund. The effect of the STOPIA is that the maximum
amount of compensation payable by shipowners (ulti-
mately the P&I Clubs) whose ships are of 29,548 gross
tonnage or less would be 20 million SDR.12 The original
STOPIA applies only to the Supplementary Fund member
states. In 2006, through the STOPIA 2006, it was extended
to the 1992 Fund member states as well. In addition, the
International Group of P&I Clubs made another offer
called TOPIA (Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification
Agreement) 2006 to indemnify the Supplementary Fund
for 50% of the compensation it has to pay for an
incident.13 However, these most recent changes of STOPIA
2006 and TOPIA 2006 do not concern the compensation
for oil pollution victims (hence the financial caps) as such,
but merely how the costs of oil spills are re-allocated
between the shipping and the oil industries. Therefore,
these recent developments are less relevant for the central
issue of this paper, being the financial caps.
3.2. Introduction of financial caps in the oil pollution
compensation regime
At the 1969 diplomatic conference which led to the
conclusion of the CLC 1969, most of the debate centered
on who should bear the liability for the compensation of oil
pollution damage, and whether it should be a strict liability
or liability based on negligence. However, after rounds of
discussion, no agreement could be reached concerning
these issues. The Belgian delegation submitted a proposal
on an international compensation fund, an idea which was
originally developed by French legal experts [11]. This
scheme immediately attracted the attention of many
delegations, and they mostly changed their attitudes
towards a compromise solution. In this situation, the UK
delegation proposed a compromise package deal. It
proposed to impose strict liability on the shipowner, while
capped to the highest amount that was insurable. Accord-
ing to the UK delegate, this would be 1900 francs per
tonne with a ceiling of 210 million francs [12,13] Other
delegations proposed figures varying from 1000 to 3000http://www.iopcfund.org/SDR.htm, last accessed on 31 August 2007.
12See Articles III and IV of the STOPIA.
13See Article IV of the TOPIA.
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14Some delegations believed a moderate increase would be sufficient,
some believed in a substantial increase to cover even the catastrophic cases
as well.
15OCIMF stands for Oil Companies International Marine Forum. It
was founded on 8 April 1970 in London and was initially the response
from the oil industry to the Torrey Canyon. It includes oil companies
shipping over 85% of the world’s crude and fuel oil. It has been granted a
consultative status at IMO since 1971.
16See also the OCIMF Statement, July 1982, LEG/CONF.6/INF.3, p.
376–378. Nevertheless, this document was criticized during the Legal
Committee meeting in 1982 for the way in which the statistics had been
selected. In addition, the International Group of P&I Clubs (LEG/
CONF.6/14), in its table on the distribution of incidents by ship size,
concluded that there seemed to be no direct correlation between ship size
and the cost of spill, although spills from small ships were less frequent
than from large ships, and the average costs per incident increased with
ship size. However, the International Group of P&I Clubs remained in
favor of a tonnage related system on the basis of other considerations.
17Japan, China, Canada, Italy and Morocco expressed their support for
the tonnage related system.
18Democratic Republic of Germany, Sweden, Bahamas and some
organizations with observer status were also in favor of the tonnage
related system.
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a compensation fund financed by the oil industry, the
delegations accepted the UK compromise proposal, with a
slight change from 1900 to 2000 francs, simply for
the convenience of calculation [13]. Hence, the CLC
1969 provided in Article V that the owner may limit his
liability ‘‘in respect of any one incident to an aggregate
amount of 2000 francs (133 SDR) for each tonne of
the ship’s tonnage. However, this aggregate amount shall
in any event not exceed 210 million francs (14 million
SDR)’’.
It may seem striking that at the 1969 conference, there
was little debate on whether to accept the financial caps as
a principle, and it was mainly justified in order to obtain
insurance and as a compromise to counterbalance the
harsh effect of strict liability. It was probably due to the
long history of the limitation system in maritime law and
the time pressure to come with an international regime that
the limitation as a principle was not debated as such. There
was only some debate concerning the specific figures of the
financial caps. The delegations agreed on some general
principles, such as that the amount should provide
adequate compensation to the victims, which corresponds
with the magnitude of the damage [14,15]; this amount
should be the maximum amount that is insurable, given the
fact that the insurance capacity is not unlimited [13,14]; the
caps should also take into account the costs for cleaning up
the oil pollution [14].
However, these general principles did not provide a
justification for the particular amounts proposed, and
interestingly, the final adjustment of the figure was simply
to make the calculation easier. The finally adopted figure
doubled the existing financial caps under the Limitation
Convention 1957, but it was still considered acceptable by
most of the delegations since it would not be too high to
stop the major maritime countries from ratifying the
convention. The limitation of liability with such an amount
was introduced together with the strict liability on the
shipowner as a compromise solution [13].
3.3. 1984 protocols
3.3.1. Increase of the limitation amount
The CLC 1969 came into effect in 1975 and the Fund
Convention in 1978. Shortly after, the financial caps
introduced were challenged by some major oil spill
incidents, including the Amoco Cadiz in 1978, which
caused damage higher than the limited amount provided in
the CLC 1969. This triggered the convening of the 1984
diplomatic conference to revise the international oil
pollution compensation regime.
Most delegations at the 1984 conference agreed that the
balance established under the CLC/Fund regime should be
maintained [16–18]. Thus, according to them, the increase
of financial caps under the CLC should be accompanied
with the increase of compensation under the Fund
Convention. As a result, the debate on the increase of thecompensation focused on the increase of both the CLC and
the Fund simultaneously.
Despite some divergence concerning the degree of
increase of the financial caps [16–18],14 the delegations
generally agreed that the existing compensation amounts
needed to be revised. Their main arguments for increasing
the financial caps included inflation, the increased capacity
of the insurance market and the increased clean-up costs
[16,17,19,20].
Two particular issues were raised relating to the
limitation of the liability system. One was related to the
calculation of the limitation amounts. More precisely it
concerned the question whether the basis of the limit
should remain on the tonnage of the ship. The OCIMF15
produced some graphs to show that there was no clear
relationship between the size of ships and the cost of oil
spills, and it therefore proposed to abandon the tonnage-
related system and adopt fixed limitation amounts for all
ships.16 However, most government delegations attached
great importance to the tonnage related system and they
considered that the calculation of the limitation of liability
of the shipowner should continue to be based on the
tonnage of the ship [16–18].17,18 Hence, despite some
differing opinion from observers, the link between the
limitation and tonnage was nevertheless maintained.
Another issue concerned the financial caps for small
ships. The CLC 1969 did not prescribe any minimum
amount to be paid in case of incidents involving small
tankers. However, the small tankers may nevertheless
cause large scale damage. This resulted in the situation
that victims receive disproportionately small amount of
compensation compared to the amount of damage
sustained [21,22]. It was pointed out by the International
Group of P&I Clubs and some other delegations that
where there is a minimum for small ships, the chances of an
intervention from the Fund for minor cases would be
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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usefulness would be doubtful; thus most delegations
considered that there should be a minimum liability for
small tankers [16–18].20 On the other hand, some delega-
tions also pointed out that such limitation for small ships
should not be too high in order not to put an undue burden
on small ships [18].
The amounts proposed by different delegations were
largely diverse, the financial caps for shipowners under the
CLC varied from $30 to 100 million. As for small ships, the
tonnage varied between 5000 and 30,000 ton, and its
minimum threshold varied from $3 to 15 million.21 After
consultation with many delegations, The Chairman pro-
posed a package proposal. Under the CLC, for small ships
of less than 5000 GRT, the maximum liability should be 3
million SDR; above that, 420 SDR per tonne, capped at
59.7 million SDR (140,000 GRT). Under the Fund, the
basic coverage (including payment from the shipowner)
should be 135 million SDR; the expanded coverage
(including payment from the shipowner) should be 200
million SDR. The expanded coverage is when the
contributing oil from three states equals to 600 million
tonnes [23,24]. Most delegations, although not completely
satisfied with the proposal, were still willing to accept it in
order to reach at least some positive results [24].22
Thus the amounts as proposed by the Chairman were
agreed upon [25].3.3.2. Loss of limitation right
Under Article V. 2 of the CLC 1969, the shipowner
would lose the right to limit his liability if ‘‘the incident
occurred as a result of the actual fault or privity of the
owner’’.23 As the shipowner was often guilty of actual fault
or with privity, it could lead to some problems in practice.
The determination of the existence of fault or privity often
delayed the compensation process, not only because the
settlement was postponed, due to the difficulty in
determining whether the shipowner could take advantage
of the limitation, but also the Fund could not settle the
claims before the limitation was decided [26].24 Moreover,
different national courts often gave different interpreta-19In the document submitted by the P&I Clubs (INF.3), according to its
data in Table 7, among the 14 spills of ships of less than 1000 ton that
Fund has intervened, if there were a minimum threshold, the Fund would
not have compensated.
20For instance, the US, Canada, France, The Netherlands, UK,
German Democratic Republic, Finland, Greece, USSR, Norway, Sweden,
Denmark.
21Summarized by the chairman, see OR 1984, SR.6, 382. There were
other proposals such as the proposal from UK, Federal Republic of
Germany, Democratic Republic of Germany, Japan, USSR, see OR 1984,
SR.6, 375–379.
22See the view expressed by delegations such as Chile, Malaysia, UK,
US, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Sweden and Canada.
23Art.V.2 of the CLC 1969.
24According to the P&I Clubs, the criterion of ‘fault or privity’ which
determines whether the ship owner is entitled to limit his liability was one
of the most glaring defects of the CLC.tions of the concept of ‘‘fault or privity’’ which led to
disparities in the compensation for oil pollution damage in
the contracting states [27].
At the 1984 conference, most delegations were in favor
of changing such a provision on the conditions to lose the
limitation right and adopt the same wording as in the 1976
LLMC, which provided that ‘‘The owner shall not be
entitled to limit his liability under this Convention if it is
proved that the pollution damage resulted from his
personal act or omission, committed with the intent to
cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that
such damage would probably result’’.
The new criterion on the loss of limitation right was
regarded as involving a considerable increase of the
liability limits since it made the right to limit almost
unbreakable [27,28]. But these delegations believed un-
breakability was important for the limitation of liability
[29]. As a result, the same wording as adopted in the
LLMC 1976 was finally approved [30].25
Such a provision implies that the burden of proving that
the conditions for breaking the limit are fulfilled was laid
on the claimant.26 Some research has come to the
conclusion that the 1984 provision on breaking the right
of limitation is stricter and much harder to circumvent than
the 1969 provision. Hence, it provides better protection for
the shipowners than the CLC 1969 [27]. There was also the
view that such a test in the 1984 Protocol was very close to
the insurance law concept of ‘‘willful misconduct’’ under
the marine insurance policy. Consequently, it was con-
cluded that when the owner loses his right of limitation, he
also loses his liability insurance cover. The implication of
this for practice might be that claimants would be
discouraged from challenging the shipowner’s right of
limitation of liability [27–29]. If they were not confronted
with a financial cap on liability, they might then be
confronted with a defendant without insurance cover.3.4. 1992 Protocols
The entry into force conditions in the 1984 Protocols
were laid down in such a way that the Protocols could not
come into effect until the US ratified them. However, when
the US was hit by the Exxon Valdez in 1989, it decided to
adopt its own national regime (the Oil Pollution Act 1990)
which closed the door for the US to ratify the international
conventions. Still, the changes made in the 1984 Protocols
were needed, as demonstrated by the oil spills such as
Exxon Valdez. Moreover, there was a growing sentiment,
especially among the European member states to the
Conventions, that something had to be done to bring the
substance of those instruments into force in order to keep
the international system up to date and to avoid the threat
of further regional schemes like the one adopted by the US.25Sweden, Netherlands, Norway.
26The same applied to the LLMC 1976, and the same point was made at
the 1984 Conference, see OR 1984, LEG/CONF.6/SR.13, 456.
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because it had suffered the greatest exposure to the risks of
oil spills. Thus another diplomatic conference was con-
vened in 1992 to take up the changes made in 1984 while
eliminating the need of US participation.
The CLC 1992 has increased the financial limits to the
amounts which were originally agreed in the 1984 Protocols.
3.5. 2000 Amendments and 2003 Supplementary Fund
Protocol
The compensation amounts under the 1992 Conventions
(the CLC 1992 together with the increased compensation
under the Fund Convention 1992) were considered at the
time sufficient to cover most of the oil spill incidents.
However, the Erika incident in 1999 and Prestige in 2002
again showed that such a limited amount was far from
sufficient. The European Commission published several
packages of legislation proposals known as the Erika I, [30]
Erika II [31] and Erika III proposals. The Commission in the
Erika I proposals condemned the financial caps as provided
in the international conventions as being insufficient; the
victims of serious oil spills would remain inadequately
compensated. In the Erika II proposals, the Commission
even proposed to set up a regional fund for Europe.27
Threatened by the EU regional actions, the IMO quickly
increased the financial caps (together with the compensation
provided from the Fund) by 50.37% in 2000 through the
adoption of two Amendments.28 Later in 2003, a Supple-
mentary Fund Protocol was adopted to provide a third tier of
compensation. The amounts in the 2000 Amendments, in











IntFor a ship not exceeding 5000 gross tonnage: liability is
limited to 4.5 million SDR (US$ 7 million) (compared
with 3 million SDR under the CLC 1992);
 for a ship of 5000 to 140,000 gross tonnage: liability is
limited to 4.5 million SDR (US$ 7 million) plus 631
SDR (US$ 963) for each additional gross tonne over
5000 (compared with 3 million SDR plus 420 SDR for
each additional gross tonne under the CLC 1992);
 for a ship over 140,000 gross tonnage: liability is limited
to 89.8 million SDR (US$ 136 million) (compared with
59.7 million SDR under the CLC 1992).
The historical evolution of the caps and the available
amount of compensation can be summarized as follows:7See in this respect the amended proposal for a regulation of the
ropean Parliament and of the Council on the Establishment of a Fund
the Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage in European Waters and
lated Measures, Official Journal C227 E/487, 24 September 2002.
8Two Resolutions concerning the Amendments were adopted. These
Resolution: Adoption of Amendments of the Limitation Amounts in
Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil
bility for Pollution Damage, 1969, and Resolution: Adoption of
endments of the Limits of Compensation in the Protocol of 1992 to
end the International Convention on the Establishment of an
ernational Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971.3.6. Evaluation
The principle to limit the liability of the shipowner was
easily accepted at the 1969 conference, even without
discussing the legitimacy of shifting the effect of the
limitation to innocent third party victims. Compared with
the prior situation where the liability of the shipowner was
based on general tort principles or fault, the strict liability
imposed on the tanker owner by the convention was rather
harsh. The limitation of liability was thus welcomed
because it could to a certain extent alleviate the severe
impact on the shipowner through the shift to strict liability.
Therefore, the limitation of liability is considered a
mechanism of cost sharing between all those involved in
and benefiting from the maritime adventure, rather than
imposing all the losses on one single party [4].29
Another justification for the limitation employed by the
delegations at the 1969 conference is to make the ship-
owner’s liability insurable as it introduces an element of
predictability [4]. However, this argument is also doubtful
as the liability can be unlimited while the amount of
insurance can be restricted to a certain amount.
The limitation adopted in the CLC 1969 had almost
doubled the then existing limit under the Limitation
Convention 1957, but the limitation amount has been
substantially increased since then. It is interesting to notice
that victim compensation was set out as the goal of the
international convention in 1969, but in order to strike the
balance so that it can be widely accepted by the major
maritime nations, a paradoxical limitation of liability was
introduced. However, even more paradoxically, this
amount was again and again criticized for being insufficient
and thus needed to be updated. Thus, one may wonder
what the rationale is of limiting the liability.4. Critiques of the limitation of liability
Not only the financial caps in the marine oil pollution
compensation regime, but caps in maritime law as such
have often been criticized by both lawyers and economists.
A first critique is that financial caps in maritime law in
fact constitute a subsidy to the shipping industry at the cost
of other interests (more particular of the injured party). It
has been argued that in the early days of shipping the caps
were needed as a stimulant for investment in shipping due
to its highly risky nature, but this historical justification is
no longer valid, and the widespread use of insurance,
particularly third party liability insurance, could consider-
ably reduce such risks [1]. Financial caps allow the industry
to pay only part of the damage it has caused. Ultimately it
will be society at large that bears the cost of damage caused
by shipping [9]. However, no country is willing to take
away the subsidy from their industry because they are29The modern theory on the limitation of liability justifies the limitation
as a means to achieve ‘an equitable distribution of the risks inevitably
attached to a maritime adventure’. See Seward [4].
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competitive disadvantages [32,33]. This might explain the
long survival of financial caps notwithstanding these
criticisms.
A second critique concerns the relationship between the
financial caps and liability insurance. It is often argued that
the statutory limitation of liability is necessary to obtain
insurance. One could equally presume a situation where the
limitation of liability and insurance were separated, with
the consequence that the liability of the shipowner
remained unlimited, but the insurance provided cover only
to a certain amount [1,9]. Wetterstein argued that the
insurance industry’s capacity should not constitute an
obstacle to unlimited liability because the special structure
of marine liability insurance (through P&I Clubs) and
reinsurance (through pooling agreement between the
Clubs), facilitate a very substantial (and growing) capacity
[9]. Indeed, the most recent change took place in 2006 when
the small tankers insured by the P&I Clubs agreed
voluntarily to increase their financial caps.30 This change
once more showed the potential capacity of the insurance
market.
Another often quoted argument for maintaining the
financial limits is that the introduction of unlimited liability
would increase the operating costs for the shipowners [34].
However, according to empirical studies, this would only
lead to a marginal increase in overall operating costs.
On the other hand, there is a relative advantage of
unlimited liability (while liability insurance is capped to a
certain amount), being that it provides incentives for
prevention. In such a situation, there will be liability
exceeding the insurance ceiling, which will then be born by
the activity causing such damage, and it will in turn provide
incentives for prevention [9].
5. Economic analysis of financial caps
The previous section made clear that both lawyers and
economists have already been critical of financial caps
especially in the domain of oil pollution damage. We will
now address financial caps in maritime law generally and
more particularly with respect to oil pollution damage
using traditional economic analysis of law, more particu-
larly the Coase theorem and the economics of accident law.
First the consequences of a financial cap on liability in the
contract situation will be analyzed (Section 5.1), next
attention will be given to the situation where the victim is
(like in the oil pollution case) a third party who does not
stand in a contractual relationship with the injurer (Section
5.2). Then the question will be asked what the potential
effects are of a financial cap on the liability (Section 5.3).
To be clear: within the context of this paper we only
address one aspect of the international oil pollution
compensation regime, being the financial cap on liability;
other aspects of this regime, such as the exclusive30See on this so-called STOPIA 2006 and TOPIA 2006.channelling of the liability to the tanker owner have been
critically analyzed elsewhere [35,36].
5.1. The contract situation
The starting point for any economic analysis, including
the analysis of the compensation for victims of oil pollution
is undoubtedly the Coase theorem [37]. One can argue that
the Coase theorem does have a relevance in the sense that
there is a contractual relationship between the tanker
owner who agrees to transport cargo with his tanker and
on the other hand the party representing the cargo
interests. In such a contractual bargaining setting parties
could in principle ex ante agree on the optimal amount
of care to be performed by the tanker owner and on
the damages, which could be related to the specific
preferences of both parties and to e.g. their ability to seek
insurance coverage. In that case the agreement concerning
the distribution of risk might also be reflected in the
contract price that has to be paid for shipping the oil (the
freight) [38].
A result of this reasoning is that it would in the context
of liability for oil pollution damage in theory make no
difference whether liability is allocated to either the tanker
owner or to the cargo interests. As long as free negotiations
(in a low transaction cost setting) are possible, shifting the
liability to the tanker owner would simply mean that the
price charged for transport would be increased. In the
alternative it would be the cargo owner (on the assumption
that that would be the governing rule) that would bear the
liability. In any event the cargo interests will pass on the
costs of liability for oil pollution damage to the end user of
the cargo, being those who have a demand for oil related
products.
The Coase theorem of course only applies in the
situation where passing on of costs of a tanker owner
and the cargo interests is possible and may hence have its
importance for the question whether liability should be
allocated to one of these parties. On the assumption that
the conditions of the Coase theorem are met one could
argue that this should in principle not make a difference. It
may only be different if costless passing on of increased
liabilities were not possible.
The same conclusion could also be reached with respect
to the issue discussed in this paper, being a financial cap
on liability. Such a so-called financial cap is from a
policy perspective not too problematic as long as this
is (implicitly) agreed between a potential injurer (tanker
owner) and a victim within a contractual setting. In the
contractual setting well informed parties may agree to
cap liability; in that particular case there is as such no
specific reason for a legislative intervention, to prohibit a
cap.
From this it follows that a distinction has to be made
between the situation where the victim stands in a
contractual relationship with the injurer and the one where
the victim is a third party.
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financial caps on liability can be efficient in the contrac-
tual setting. In that case they could simply signal the
division of risk bearing between the cargo owner and the
tanker owner. Traditionally in maritime law there were
always financial caps on the liability of the shipowner as
maritime transporter.31 A limited liability will, of course,
be reflected in the transport price. In this particular
contractual setting, where informed parties agree to cap
liability, this should not cause major worries from a policy
perspective.
This therefore corresponds with the traditional justifica-
tion advanced in maritime law in favor of the limitation of
liability (see Section 2.3) whereby the cap is considered as
striking a balance between the interest of the cargo owners
and the shipping industry.
The cap on liability in the contract setting, moreover, has
the advantage that the potential victim could, depending
upon his preferences and attitude to risk, purchase
individualized insurance coverage. A generalized unlimited
liability of the shipowner could lead to a general increase of
shipping prices also for those potential victims who do not
want this additional protection. It is a classic argument in
the economic analysis of law against strict liability in these
situations where increased liabilities can be passed on:
prices may be increased for all whereas only some (high
risk) individuals may benefit from this increased protec-
tion. An efficiency loss and a negative redistribution may
be the result [39–43].
5.2. Third party losses
The situation is of course different when, as in the case of
oil pollution damage, the victim is not a party standing in a
contractual relationship with the injurer, but a third party.
In that case transaction costs are prohibitive and hence
Coasean bargaining may not provide a solution.
Given the fact that many victims of oil pollution damage
(e.g. coastal states) may not stand in a contractual
relationship with the tanker owner, a legislative interven-
tion is necessary to remedy the externality resulting from
oil pollution damage. A legal rule should thus be put in
place to give the tanker owner appropriate incentives to
follow an optimal care level. The economic literature on
accident law has largely demonstrated that liability rules
may be put in place to serve this goal [44,45]. The outcome
of this literature can well be applied to the case of oil
pollution damage as well.
Usually a distinction is made in the literature between
the so-called unilateral accident case, being the one where
only one party (referred to as the injurer) can influence the
accident risk and the bilateral accident situation (where the
victim can influence the accident risk as well). This
distinction also has its importance for the analysis of
financial caps.31See Section 2.5.2.1. Unilateral accident situation
The literature holds that in a so called unilateral accident
case, being one where only the injurer can influence the
accident risk, both negligence and strict liability lead to
efficient care levels, but only strict liability leads to an
efficient activity level of the injurer as well [46,47]. Only
under strict liability would the potential injurer have an
incentive to adopt an optimal activity level. This full
internalization is obviously only possible if the injurer is
effectively exposed to the full costs of the activity he
engages in and is therefore in principle held to provide full
compensation to a victim. An obvious disadvantage of a
system of financial caps is that this will seriously impair the
victim’s rights to full compensation. If the cap is indeed set
at a much lower amount than the expected damage, this
would not only violate the victim’s right on compensation,
but the above mentioned full internalization of the
externality would not take place either. From an economic
point of view, a limitation of compensation therefore poses
a serious problem since there will be no internalization of
the risky activity. Indeed, if one believes that the exposure
to liability has a deterrent effect, a limitation of the amount
of compensation due to victims poses another problem.
There is a direct relationship between the magnitude of the
accident risk and the amount to be spent on optimal care
by the potential polluter. If the liability therefore is limited
to a certain amount, the potential injurer will consider the
accident as one with a magnitude capped at the limited
amount. Hence, he will not spend the care necessary to
reduce the total accident costs. Obviously, the amount of
care spent by the potential injurer will be lower and a
problem of underdeterrence will arise. The amount of
optimal care, reflected in the optimal standard, being the
care necessary to reduce the total accident costs efficiently,
will be higher than the amount the potential injurer will
spend to avoid an accident equal to the statutory limited
amount.
The same problem also arises under strict liability from
the moment that the amount of the damage is higher than
the injurer’s wealth. In that case insolvency has the same
negative effects on deterrence as a financial cap and a
negligence rule would even be preferred. However, the
solution for the potential insolvency problem (which
can also arise under oil pollution) is not to shift to the
(inefficient) negligence rule, but rather to impose a duty
to seek financial coverage such as e.g. compulsory
insurance [36].325.2.2. Bilateral accidents
The picture, however, changes somewhat when account
is taken of the victim’s influence on the accident risk as
well. This is usually referred to as the bilateral accident
situation. In that case it is held that no liability rule iscompulsory insurance is a necessary component of a strict liability regime
for oil pollution damage in order to prevent underdeterrence.
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economic literature it follows that whenever the victim can
have its influence on the care level as well (so-called
bilateral accidents) a liability rule should be chosen that
provides incentives to the victim for taking optimal care as
well. This may either be a negligence rule or a defence
which has to be added to the strict liability rule
(comparative or contributory negligence) [48].34
This difference between the unilateral and the bilateral
accident may also have its importance for an economic
evaluation of financial caps. In the unilateral accident
situation it was argued that a full exposure of the injurer to
the costs of his activity is necessary in order to fully
internalize the costs caused by oil pollution damage.
The conclusion may, however, be different in case of
bilateral accidents, where the victim’s behavior may also
affect the accident risk. The standard argument against
providing full compensation to victims in case of bilateral
accidents is that victims can take precautionary measures
which are not always observable by judges and which can
therefore not be fully accounted for in contributory or
comparative negligence defences [41,49,50]. A limit on the
compensation in case of bilateral accidents may therefore
be useful in cases where victims should be given additional
incentives to reduce the accident risk. Whether caps are
efficient in specific bilateral accident cases will depend on
the circumstances. The question arises—inter alia—
whether exposing the victim to risk is indeed necessary to
provide these additional incentives or whether the victim’s
incentives can be optimally controlled via the contributory
negligence defence. Also the amount of the cap remains
important. If the cap were set too low this would give
incentives to the victim but it could equally lead to serious
underdeterrence of the injurer.
5.3. Effects
The previous subsection showed that there are relatively
few reasons to introduce financial caps in case of liability
towards third parties. The question now arises what the
potential effects may be if such a cap is nevertheless
introduced in liability.
5.3.1. Underdeterrence
In this respect we can be brief: the economic literature
shows that a strict liability rule is efficient only if the
potential tortfeasor is fully exposed to the potential
damage which may result from his activity. A financial
limit on the (strict) liability of the tanker owner will have
the same effect as the insolvency of the tanker owner:33For the simple reason that strict liability with a contributory
negligence defence will give optimal incentives for care and activity level
to the injurer, but not to the victim (no optimal incentives to follow an
optimal activity level).
34In both cases the contribution of the victim to the accident risk is
taken into account and the victim’s claim on damages will be reduced
wholly (contributory) or partially (comparative negligence).underdeterrence. The tanker owner will consider the
accident only as one where the limited amount of liability
is the maximum damage that can be suffered and a
corresponding (lower) level of preventive measures will be
chosen. As such, a financial cap on liability can therefore
be considered inefficient, more particularly since it
concerns here a situation where damage is suffered by
third parties so that Coasean bargaining is not possible.
A possible justification for the cap could be found in the
situation where one would argue that the comparative
negligence defence (just mentioned) would not provide
adequate incentives to victims (more particularly the
coastal states suffering the oil pollution damage). In that
case one could argue that lower than full compensation for
the victims may provide additional incentives for victim’s
care. However, given the fact that it is more important to
control the injurer’s incentives than the victim’s and
considering the fact that the CLC does provide for a
comparative negligence defence, there is no reason to
assume that this defence cannot adequately provide
incentives for care to the victims of oil pollution damage.
Moreover, the positive effects a cap may have on victim
incentives would probably be totally countered by the
negative effects this would have on the tanker owner’s
incentives for prevention.
However, the fact that, principally, a financial limit on
liability as contained in the CLC should be considered
inefficient does not necessarily mean that the cap will in
practice also lead to a higher level of oil pollution incidents.
First, for many (smaller) oil pollution incidents, the
damage may well be lower than the limit on liability. The
risk of underdeterrence may therefore only arise in those
(catastrophic) cases where the amount of the damage
actually was higher than the cap. Second, the prevention of
oil pollution incidents is today primarily dependent upon
regulation aiming at an optimal tanker design and at better
training for the seafarers to prevent spill risks. Liability
rules, therefore, have at most an additional deterrent effect
to back up this regulation. The fact that the cap may create
underdeterrence and thus may affect this additional
incentive should not necessarily lead to an increase of
pollution incidents. That will depend upon the effectiveness
of the regulatory system and the extent to which liability
rules provide supplementary incentives.
This argument has recently received serious support in a
doctoral dissertation by Hay who argues that the
regulatory system suffers from a serious enforcement
deficit and that therefore more can be expected from
an exposure of the tanker owner to full liability than from
the regulatory regime [51]. In this respect Hay also relies
on empirical US-based research, arguing that after
the introduction of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) in the
US in 1990 the liability regime installed by OPA seems to
have encouraged polluters to choose a level of precaution
which minimizes pollution abatement costs whereas
this literature is far more critical of the regulatory
provisions of OPA, more particularly the double hull
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the assumption in the economic literature that the financial
cap may lead to underdeterrence, even in the presence of a
regulatory system, which equally aims at the prevention of
oil spills [51].36
5.3.2. Subsidy
A second well-known effect of a limitation of liability,
described in the economic literature, is that a financial cap
will function as a subsidy. The tanker owner not being fully
exposed to the costs of oil pollution damage in fact receives
a financial advantage through the financial cap. This
subsidy is primarily to the benefit of the tanker owner since
the cap will result in lower insurance coverage costs.
However, since these costs can be passed on to the cargo
interests the oil industry will benefit from this subsidy as
well. However, a part of the subsidy that benefits the oil
industry is countered by the fact that the oil industry
contributes to the International Oil Pollution Compensa-
tion Fund (referred to as the IOPC Fund, or the Fund).
Oil receivers finance this fund by levies on the oil
transported. The losers in this subsidized regime are
obviously the victims to the extent that their damage is
not compensated under the international regime (the CLC
and the Fund).
Abolishing the financial limit on liability would of course
lead to an increase in oil prices. However, the financial
impact of the subsidy seems to be relatively low. Especially
interesting in this respect is a study by Smets who analyzed
in 1983 what the effects would be of an increase of
the available amount of compensation by $250,000,000
(compared to the limit of $ 52,000,000 available at that
time) [53]. Smets argues that the economic effects of such
an increase would be limited as large oil spills are rare
events compared with the total number of oil spills. He
calculated that the economic impact of the mentioned
increase would be less than $0.055 per tonne transported
and would thus be insignificant. The same conclusion
was reached by the European Commission in the Erika
proposals [54].
This leads to a few interesting conclusions. One of the
distorting aspects of the subsidy constituted by the
financial cap is inter alia the fact that the price of oil will
be relatively too cheap. Relative in this respect means that
the price of oil does not reflect correctly social costs and
will therefore be relatively cheap, compared to other
alternatives that would (by hypothesis) fully internalize
social costs [55].37 However, the quoted study by Smets
shows that the nominal influence of even a serious increase
of the compensation due on oil prices would be minimal.35It is more particularly argued that the costs of the double hull
requirements would outweigh the benefits.
36This is also one of the conclusions of the dissertation by Hay [51], who
therefore argues in favor of abolishing the caps.
37However, it should also be recognized that the subsidy of other energy
resources may exist as well. In this respect, the overconsumption of oil
energy may be counter-balanced to certain extent.This can also be supported by the fact that since the entry
into force of the Supplementary Fund Convention of 2003
(in 2005) an even larger amount of total compensation is
available through the Supplementary Fund of almost one
billion dollar. Although oil prices have significantly
increased since then it may be clear that this is rather due
to developments on the international market than to this
legislative change. Even though therefore the nominal
influence of abolishing the financial cap (or seriously
increasing the limits) may be very small (and with that also
the market distortive effects) this can at the same time be
used as an argument to hold that the financial caps today
are not justified any longer. It would apparently not have a
devastating effect on the industry concerned.
5.3.3. Undercompensation
In serious cases the financial caps on liability can also
lead to undercompensation of the victim. This problem of
undercompensation can easily be shown by referring to the
historical evolution which was sketched above (see Sections
3.3–3.5). Every time a new incident with higher damage
occurred the limits were again increased since the then
existing limits apparently did not suffice to provide
compensation to accident victims [36]. In his thesis
Julien Hay provides an overview of the amounts of
damage caused by the largest tanker incidents in recent
history [51]:
Given the amounts available at the time, these incidents
could not be fully compensated. Today, through the
entry into force of the Supplementary Fund Protocol
on 3 March 2005, an amount is available of around 1000
million US Dollars. Hence, this may suffice to compen-
sate today even most of the large oil spill incidents.
However, history has shown that in the case of every new
large incident the damage again was larger.38 It can
therefore not be excluded that, notwithstanding all the
recent changes, the current regime of the financial cap
under the CLC combined with the supplementary fund,
will not always be sufficient to provide full compensation in
all cases.
Of course, one could argue that insufficient compensa-
tion to victims of oil pollution is not an economic
consequence in the sense that whether or not a victim is
compensated is primarily a distributional issue rather than
an efficiency one. However, the type of catastrophic losses
potentially caused by oil pollution incidents to an entire
coastal region can be quite devastating for the affected
area. It may affect prices of real estate and potentially even
disrupt economic development in the particular sector and
thus have consequences that go far beyond the mere direct
victims of the oil pollution. Therefore, even from an
economic perspective, an argument can be made that funds
should be made available to compensate the losses and
assist in restoration.38Also due to the refinement of clean-up techniques and the related
increase of costs.
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6.1. Caps in a critical perspective
From the economic analysis of financial caps for oil
pollution damage presented in Section 5, it follows that the
conclusions of much of the critical (legal and economic)
literature presented in Section 4 can largely be upheld:
there seems to be no justification for the introduction of
financial caps for oil pollution damage where third parties
are a victim. The question therefore arises why financial
caps were introduced at all in the CLC in 1969. Limitation
of the liability was, as a principle, hardly discussed during
the 1969 conference preceding the CLC. Liability in
maritime law had always been limited. The problem is, of
course, that in traditional maritime law, limitation applies
mainly in the contractual context towards a cargo owner.39
In that case the limit does not pose a specific problem since
the limitation of liability can be compensated with a lower
price for the transport. The cargo owner who expects
higher losses could seek protection through first party
insurance.
Although these arguments do not apply in the context of
liability to third parties, the principle of limitation was
hardly discussed. It was only mentioned (more particularly
by the UK delegation) that a system of limitation of
liability was justified by the mechanism of compulsory
insurance [14]. That argument is, however, not very
convincing since the duty to insure could have been limited
to an (insurable) amount whereas the liability itself could
have remained unlimited. Most of the discussions during
the 1969 conference merely focused on the amount of the
limit, not on the principle as such. Remarkable in that
respect was that this amount was fixed on the basis of the
tonnage of the ship, but the question was hardly asked
whether the limited amount of compensation available
would be sufficient to cover the actual costs of a (major)
pollution incident [14].40 The tonnage of the ship could
indeed influence the scale of potential damage caused by it,
but there are other factors that will also influence the
pollution risk.
The basic problem seems to be related to the fact that the
drafters of the convention were insufficiently aware of the
fact that the limits in traditional maritime law apply in a
contractual context where the potential victim stands in a
Coasean bargaining situation with the injurer, whereas
such a relationship between the tanker owner and the
victim of oil pollution damage is usually lacking. The
introduction of inefficient financial caps can probably
be explained as a simple result of ‘path dependency’39The 1924 Limitation Convention mainly addressed damages suffered
in the contractual sphere (to cargo interests). The subsequent Limitation
Conventions (1976) were not explicitly limited to contractual damage, but
their main focus was again on damage in the contractual sphere.
40Only the US delegation argued that the limit should be fixed in such a
way that substantially all losses would be covered.(Section 6.2) or perhaps (although not so clear) as the
result of lobbying by interest groups (Section 6.3).
6.2. Path dependency
The fact that the drafters of the CLC simply introduced
a limit on the financial liability of the tanker owner without
much discussion may, from a theoretical perspective, be
explained by the phenomenon known as ‘path depen-
dency’. In simple terms, path dependency refers to the fact
that choices made (in markets, but also by regulators) may
to a large extent depend upon past decisions. Arthur argues
that there is often a so-called ‘lock-in by historical events’
[56]. The basic insight is that initial action has put people
on a path that cannot be left without some costs [57,58].
The literature moreover indicates that path dependency
may to a large extent also explain why inefficient decisions
are sometimes taken. The working of ‘laissez faire markets’
is that we can as a result of this path dependence stick on
undesirable paths.
Although this notion of path dependency has been
developed in the literature to explain why individuals
sometimes choose inefficient decisions, its importance may
not only be limited to market actions or choices of a
particular technology. Also outside markets and more
particularly when legislation is produced path dependency
may play a role.
The model thus indeed has some appeal when addressing
the coming into being of the financial caps for oil pollution
damage. Section 2 showed that financial caps have (for
good reasons) a long tradition in maritime law. Since the
drafters of the CLC came also from this tradition it is in a
way not surprising that at the 1969 diplomatic conference,
which resulted in the CLC, the fact that the liability of the
tanker owner should be capped was accepted without any
discussion. Even when specific aspects of the limit were
discussed, like the question under which circumstances
the tanker owner could lose his limitation right (see
Section 3.3.2), even in 1984 the drafters again relied on
the 1976 LLMC. That convention, however, mainly applies
to contractual claims in maritime law. Hence, there seems
to be a strong appeal offered by existing regulations in
maritime law which may explain why the financial caps and
other features of maritime law were introduced in the
international oil pollution regime without much discussion.
It was apparently a path that may have been efficient in the
contractual relationship traditionally envisaged by mar-
itime law, but the dependency upon this path by the
drafters may be the source of the resulting inefficiency
when the same path was followed to determine the
relationship between the tanker owner and third parties.
6.3. Interest group analysis
Whenever inefficiencies are discovered in a legislative
regime, whether this is an international convention or in
national law, scholars will point to the possible influence of
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historical evolution as sketched above in Sections 2 and 3
makes clear that, even though detailed information is
lacking, one can undoubtedly notice some influence of
special interests. A starting point for the international
regime was undoubtedly (see Section 3.2) the well-known
Torrey Canyon incident which triggered the need for a
legislative reaction. That can well fit into the theory of
Rubin and Keenan concerning so-called ‘shadow interest
groups’. They argue that politicians may react to a shadow
interest group, being a group that is not active yet but that
may emerge as soon as a particular problem arises [59].
Potential victims of oil pollution damage could certainly be
considered as members of such a shadow interest group.
Once the accident occurs they could become active and
hence one understands that politicians may ex ante wish to
take their existence into account in regulation [60]. The
coming into being of the 1969 CLC can only to some extent
be explained by this shadow interest group theory. Indeed,
the Torrey Canyon incident had already occurred and thus
for those victims the benefits to be obtained from
implementing the convention were real. However, the
1969 CLC did of course come into being not only for the
victims of the Torrey Canyon, but for all other potential
victims of oil pollution damage in the future. These can
indeed be viewed as members of a shadow interest group.
Also, as far as the content of the convention and more
particularly the financial cap is concerned, it is of course
not difficult to argue that this may be the result of
successful lobbying by the shipping industry. One can
indeed clearly notice during the conference preceding the
1969 CLC that shipping nations were for obvious reasons
lobbying in favor of low financial caps on liability whereas
potential victims (coastal states) were opposing this and
preferred higher limits. Nevertheless the CLC cannot be
considered as the mere result of successful rent seeking
[61]41 by the shipping industry. The 1969 CLC/1971 Fund
Convention regime may rather be the result of a workable
balance between the competing interests. The ship-owning
states defended different interests from coastal states which
could be victimized by oil pollution and had less of a
shipping interest. Moreover, a part of the financial burden
is (as a result of the Fund Convention which provides for a
financing by the oil industry) shifted to the oil receivers.
Hence, from a public choice perspective, the international
oil pollution regime (and some of its inefficiencies, such
as the financial caps) could well be the result of a
competition between different interest groups as predicted
by Becker [62].
Moreover, the changes that took place after the original
adoption of the conventions, more particularly through
the 1992 Protocols, 2000 Amendments and 2003 Protocol41Rent seeking is an economic notion which refers to the fact that
powerful interest groups will lobby politicians to obtain legislation that
grants them benefits (the so-called rents). See, generally, Buchanan et al.
[61].(see Sections 3.4 and 3.5) could well be explained as the
result of changes in the balance of power between the
various interest groups. The more accidents occurred,
especially in western Europe and the larger the amount of
damage was, the stronger coastal states like France and
Spain became in their lobbying within the International
Maritime Organization to increase the financial compensa-
tion to the victims. The result of this changing balance of
power of course led to the most recent Supplementary
Fund Protocol whereby today substantial amounts of
compensation are provided through the fund even though
the limits on the liability of the tanker owner are still kept
in place [63].426.4. Policy conclusions
The policy conclusions that can be drawn from this
historical and economic analysis of financial caps for oil
pollution damage are relatively clear and simple: the legal
and economic scholars who always were critical of the
financial caps on liability can be supported by this analysis.
The historical analysis shows that financial caps for oil
pollution damage were indeed ‘a historical mistake’. The
path dependency of the long tradition of financial caps in
maritime law led to the inadvertence of copying this model
of caps in a (mainly) contractual relationship to caps in a
third party setting, with the resulting inefficiencies. The
historical evolution itself clearly showed that the introduc-
tion of the financial caps was a mistake: after every new
incident, with ever increasing damages, an adaptation of
the convention limits was necessary. The result has been a
cascade of protocols and amendments, whereby the
international legislator always followed the new incidents.
The normative conclusion at the policy level from this
analysis seems therefore relatively straightforward: abolish
the financial limit on the liability of the tanker owner for oil
pollution damage since it was only based on the wrong
assumption that the cap in traditional maritime law could
also function well in the case of oil pollution damage,
where third parties suffer losses.7. Concluding remarks
This paper has addressed the well-known financial caps
for oil pollution damage from an economic and a historical
perspective. Using the economic analysis of accident law it
is relatively easy to argue that financial caps on the liability
for oil pollution damage are inefficient. This result had
already been felt intuitively by some lawyers and econo-
mists. However, we attempted to add to this literature by
analyzing the legal history of the coming into being of the42This Supplementary Fund Protocol came into being as a result of
pressure from the European Union to start its own supplementary fund.
This, by the way, was introduced in Europe when France had the
presidency of the European Council. Being a victim state France of course
had a clear interest in such a European Compensation Fund.
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tional legislator who set up the 1969/1971 regime chose to
introduce these financial caps on the liability of the tanker
owner. Of course, intuitively, a law and economics scholar
would argue that the caps were probably introduced to
benefit the interest of industry, so that they can be
considered as the result of successful rent seeking by the
shipping industry.
The overview of the coming into being of the convention
shows, however, that this explanation is too simple.
Financial caps seem, as was shown in Section 2, rather to
have a long tradition in maritime law. They were justified
in maritime law as an attempt to balance the interests
between the shipowner and the cargo owner. From an
economic perspective a limitation of liability in this
contractual relationship also makes sense since it provides
the cargo owner with a possibility to secure his own
protection (inter alia through insurance). Unlimited liabi-
lity in the contractual relationship would lead to an
undifferentiated increase of prices for all cargo owners,
also for those who would not have a preference for this
increased protection and would thus not have a willingness
to pay the additional price. The limit on liability in the
contractual relationship thus allows for a differentiation
between the potential victims (cargo owners) taking into
account their preferences and e.g. the quality of the cargo
they were shipping and their attitude towards risks. In the
absence of a limit on liability, relative prices would be too
high and those expecting higher damage would be
subsidized by those with lower potential damage. A limit
on liability allows the cargo owner to obtain insurance
protection in a differentiated way.
The historical overview makes clear that these justifica-
tions for the financial cap in the contractual setting were
probably forgotten by the drafters of the CLC. A kind of
‘path dependency’ based on the long tradition of financial
caps in maritime law led to the almost undebated
acceptance of the financial caps at the 1969 conference
preceding the CLC. The principle of the financial caps was
not even debated at all, only the amount was. Hence, the
caps may to a large extent be the result of such an
inefficient path dependency, rather than the result of
successful rent seeking by the shipping industry. Indeed,
the international regime seems to be the result of a
balancing of all the interests involved. In addition to the
limited liability of the tanker owner, victims are also
granted compensation through an international oil pollu-
tion compensation fund, subsidized by the oil industry.
Although today, as a result of many legislative changes,
the amounts of available compensation for victims have
substantially increased, still many inefficiencies exist. The
most important one remains that the financial cap can lead
to potential underdeterrence of tanker owners. Empirical
research after the introduction of the American Oil
Pollution Act showed the beneficial effects of the liability
regime on prevention [55], which is confirmed by more
recent research [51]. Therefore, the major argument infavor of the abolition of the financial cap is that the cap
may lead to underdeterrence.
Of course, we realize that this analysis has several
limitations. We could only focus on one aspect of the
international oil pollution compensation regime, being the
financial caps and we addressed those from an economic
and historical perspective. However, a final judgment on
the efficiency of the international regime will of course
depend on other aspects, including the availability of
insurance for the liability of the tanker owner and of the
capacity of the insurer (the so-called Protection &
Indemnity Clubs) to monitor adequately preventive beha-
vior of the tanker owner. Moreover, some will argue that
the prevention of oil pollution should primarily be achieved
through regulations, e.g. aiming at a better functioning of
classification societies, port state control and phasing out
of some single hull tankers.
Still, the supplementary deterrent function of liability
rules, also in the context of oil pollution incidents, should
not be underestimated, as was clearly stated in the (early)
literature [55,64,65]. The fact that liability rules have
apparently not been able to prevent major oil spill incidents
can of course hardly be cited as evidence of an inadequate
deterrent function of liability rules generally. Given the
channelling of liability and the low limits, it is difficult for
liability rules to exercise fully their desired preventive effect
in the current legal context.
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